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ABSTRACT
Data encryption is the primary method of protecting the
privacy of consumer device Internet communications from
network observers. The ability to automatically detect unen-
crypted data in network traffic is therefore an essential tool
for auditing Internet-connected devices. Existing methods
identify network packets containing cleartext but cannot
differentiate packets containing encrypted data from pack-
ets containing compressed unencrypted data, which can be
easily recovered by reversing the compression algorithm.
This makes it difficult for consumer protection advocates to
identify devices that risk user privacy by sending sensitive
data in a compressed unencrypted format. Here, we present
the first technique to automatically distinguish encrypted
from compressed unencrypted network transmissions on a
per-packet basis. We apply three machine learning models
and achieve a maximum 66.9% accuracy with a convolutional
neural network trained on raw packet data. This result is
a baseline for this previously unstudied machine learning
problem, which we hope will motivate further attention and
accuracy improvements. To facilitate continuing research
on this topic, we have made our training and test datasets
available to the public.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy→ Network security; • Comput-
ing methodologies→Machine learning;
KEYWORDS
Cleartext, compression, machine learning, Internet of Things
1 INTRODUCTION
Many government agencies, industry standards groups, and
academic researchers have identified best practices for trans-
mitting private consumer information over the public In-
ternet. A cornerstone of these practices is the use of trans-
port layer encryption to prevent eavesdropping network
observers from obtaining sensitive consumer data. Unfortu-
nately, the rush to market for new IoT or other smart devices
can sometimes cause developers to cut corners, neglecting
encryption best practices and placing consumer data at risk.
While this is a concern for all networked devices, the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has noted that “companies
entering the Internet of Things (IoT) market may not have
experience in dealing with security issues,” making them
particularly likely to overlook network data encryption [8].
Lack of encryption for consumer IoT devices is especially
concerning because many have always-on environmental
sensors that constantly record user behaviors, often inside
homes or other private spaces, and stream these recordings
to the cloud [2]. Additionally, IoT devices often have limited
user interfaces, making it difficult for users to determine
the extent to which data is being collected, transmitted, or
protected.
It is therefore paramount that researchers and consumer
advocacy groups have effective tools to audit Internet-connected
devices and identify privacy concerns. The results of such
audits are often the only information consumers have by
which to choose IoT devices that provide desired privacy
protections. Negative audit results motivate manufacturers
to improve their products, while positive results help con-
sumers feel more confident that their devices do not exposing
sensitive data.
Previous research has identified numerous violations of
best practice guidelines for network data encryption by com-
panies producing IoT devices, including cases where sensi-
tive consumer medical information was sent in cleartext [13].
While not all cleartext data transmissions pose major privacy
risks, the FTC has identified cases where the observation
of unencrypted data can be used to infer extremely specific
user behavior or for various forms of identity theft [8].
While tools exist to flag cleartext network transmissions
from IoT devices [13], they fail to detect communications that
have been compressed rather than encrypted, since they rely
on assumptions about entropy and normal data distributions
which are similar between compressed and encrypted data.
Yet, compressed unencrypted data is no more secure than
unmodified cleartext; a simple reversal of the compression
algorithm is enough to recover the information, requiring
no knowledge of secret keys.
This project frames the differentiation of unencrypted
compressed packets from encrypted packets as a binary clas-
sification machine learning task, with the goal of developing
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a method for the automated detection of all unencrypted
data transmissions regardless of encoding. The method op-
erates on a per-packet basis rather than on reconstructed
files in order to facilitate device auditing by ISPs and other
entities with incomplete or sparse packet captures. While
this methodology intends to provide a tool for the analysis
of IoT consumer device traffic, its intended use case is not
in the consumer space. Instead, this project aims to provide
researchers with a faster and more integrated pipeline with
which to flag packets that may represent consumer privacy
violations.
We generated training and test datasets by collecting a
diverse set of 200 files, compressing some with the most
popular compression algorithms, encrypting the rest with
common encryption algorithms, transferring all files through
a loopback TCP connection, and capturing the resultant pack-
ets.
We trained three machine learning models to distinguish
packets containing data from compressed versus encrypted
files using only packet contents and no TCP header infor-
mation. A 5-layer convolutional neural network achieved
the highest accuracy, correctly identifying 66.9% of of pack-
ets with compressed unencrypted data. While this accuracy
leaves plenty of room for future improvement, it indicates
that the task is indeed possible despite the similarity of char-
acter distributions between encrypted and compressed data.
This result should therefore serve as a baseline for this pre-
viously unstudied machine learning task, which we hope
will attract more attention and motivate follow-up work to
improve classification accuracy. To facilitate further research,
we have made our labeled training and test datasets available
to the public at https://github.com/danielph312/comp_
detect_csv.
2 RELATEDWORK
2.1 Cleartext Detection
Wood et al. describe a method to identify cleartext informa-
tion in network traffic using a Chi-Square test, where the
observed frequency of each byte is compared to its expected
value from a uniform distribution [13]. If a packet contains
encrypted or compressed data, its expected entropy will be
very high, and the Chi-Square of its byte distribution value
will be low, since we expect a relatively uniform distribution
of bytes in encrypted data. If a packet contains cleartext,
however, its expected entropy will be lower, since natural
language cleartext would not be expected to conform to
a uniform distribution. This method yields a high success
rate in identifying cleartext packets with virtually no false-
positives. Unfortunately, this method cannot differentiate
between semantically secure encrypted data, which will be
completely random by definition, and compressed data, from
which cleartext can be recovered with a fast brute-force de-
compression approach [6]. A different approach is needed
to distinguish these two cases.
2.2 Distinguishing Compressed vs.
Encrypted Files
There are a number of existing general solutions to differ-
entiate encrypted files from compressed files. We will high-
light two previous approaches for detecting compressed files.
However, they are either ineffective or inefficient for classi-
fying network packets, especially if all traffic from a device
is not recorded (either due to network vantage point or in-
tentionally sparse packet captures).
2.2.1 Brute Force. US Patent 8799671 B2 [6] describes a
largely brute-force attack wherein files that are identified as
encoded undergo attempted decompression with a variety
of popular compression algorithms and are assumed to be
encrypted upon failing to decompress with any of these algo-
rithms [6]. While this approach is effective for files, it is not
applicable for detecting compressed unencrypted network
traffic on a per-packet basis. The nature of compression algo-
rithms means that an entire file is needed for decompression;
a single packet containing a portion of a compressed file
is insufficient. Reconstructing complete files from network
captures, however, requires a prohibitive degree of human
intervention for the analysis of large network sessions and
may not be possible if the packet capture is sparse. The tools
available for file reconstruction neglect TCP transfers in lieu
of explicit file-oriented transfer protocols such as FTP and
HTTP. While TCP file carvers do exist, they are often inac-
curate, and rely on individual file markers differentiating the
beginnings and ends of files in a data stream [7]. Addition-
ally, the reliance on these markers makes them completely
ineffective at carving encrypted data, which appears com-
pletely random, or at carving homebrew file formats that
contain unrecognized file markers, making this approach not
particularly useful for the problem at hand. Since recovering
full files for an entire network transfer is prohibitively diffi-
cult, US Patent 8799671 B2 is not directly useful for flagging
compressed packets. However, it is a practical method by
which to confirm the compression status of a recovered file,
if a reconstruction can be completed [7].
If file reconstruction using themethods identified in Stephen
Deck’s paper [7] is impossible given a series of packets
flagged as compressed, then the file would have to be recon-
structed manually, increasing human labor overhead. There-
fore, automatic detection of packets containing compressed
unencrypted data requires a very high accuracy rate, as such
packet streams may take a nontrivial amount of effort to
reconstruct and evaluate for privacy concerns.
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Figure 1: Dividing a compressed file into packets rele-
gates the most distinctive characteristics of the file to
a small percentage of the overall packets transmitted.
2.2.2 Compression Fingerprinting. ParasMalhotra describes
qualitative strategies for differentiating encrypted and com-
pressed data based on particular fingerprints left by gzip and
bzip, two popular compression algorithms [10]. However, the
data fingerprints in question typically occur at the beginning
of a given file, but files may be split into thousands of packets
in a typical TCP stream [3], of which only one will contain
the crucial fingerprint (Figure 1). This makes Malhotra’s ap-
proach impractical for per-packet classification. Therefore,
it would be advantageous to identify packets that may be
compressed, instead of files, such that a file reconstruction
can then be performed to confirm the encoding type and
examine the contained data without the need to attempt to
perform a file reconstruction on each potentially compressed
TCP transfer.
2.3 Note on TLS
By best practices, all encrypted data should be sent across a
secure TLS channel. TLS application data packets are easily
identified by their headers with no further classification tech-
niques required. However, TLS requires a certificate, which
takes time and effort to implement. Instead, some developers
may choose to use homebrew encryption (since high-quality
public cryptography libraries are free and easily available),
masquerade compression as encryption, ignore data secu-
rity altogether, or employ some other less-than-secure solu-
tion [1]. Strategies like this are of particular concern in the
IoT consumer space, where software development costs and
development time are crucial in a rapidly evolving device
marketplace [8]. We therefore focus on non-TLS TCP con-
nections in an attempt to distinguish compressed data from
data encrypted using an alternative encryption algorithm.
3 DATA COLLECTION
The supervised machine learning models we tested require
labeled training data. Given the lack of publicly available
packet captures with pre-labeled compressed and encrypted
packets, we generated our own dataset with the following
procedure. (Figure 2). We first collected a set of 200 unique
files ranging between 1 KB and 2478 KB. The files included a
range of filetypes, including PDFs, text files, pictures includ-
ing PNG, GIFs and JPGs, HTML documents, binaries, and
executables. We split these files into equally sized compres-
sion and encryption groups, attempting to maintain a similar
Figure 2: A simplified overview of the data collection
process. Data is compressed or encrypted, transmitted
over localhost, and a packet capture is generated from
the resultant network transfer.
distribution of file sizes between groups. The compression
group was further divided into five sets of 20 files each. Each
set was compressed using one of the five of the most com-
monly used compression algorithms: bzip2, 7zip, zip, rar, or
tar.gz. The encryption group was further divided into 2 sets
of 33 files and one of 34. Each set was encrypted using AES,
Blowfish, and RC5, respectively.
We then transferred all files over a TCP loopback connec-
tion to localhost in randomorderwithin the compressed/encrypted
groups, with uniformly randomized packet sizes of 500 to
1500 bytes per file transfer to approximate typical packet
size for this transmission protocol [3]. We used the appli-
cation RawCap to record packet capture (PCAP) files from
localhost loopback, providing PCAPs containing solely pack-
ets of either compressed or encrypted data with a range of
packet sizes. We then used the Python library dpkt to extract
packet contents and tag each with a classification bit (1 for
compressed, 0 for encrypted). The final result was a CSV file
containing rows of bytes terminating in a classification bit,
allowing for direct use in training and testing. While this
process provided a large and fairly normal dataset for model
training, additional preprocessing was required to account
for the input requirements of each machine learning model.
This dataset is available at https://github.com/danielph312/
comp_detect_csv. The dataset was trimmed slightly by 385
compressed packets to provide an equal sample size of com-
pressed and encrypted packets, giving us 8398 examples of
each in the 16796 row CSV file. Since the files were shuffled
prior to network transfer, the truncation of a few hundred
packets from the compressed data does not disproportion-
ately affect the representation of any individual algorithm.
The provided dataset contains packets fixed at 1024 bytes to
allow for use with neural nets, as discussed further in this
paper. This data collection strategy attempts to emulate the
general types of files that may be transmitted by IoT appli-
cations over a TCP connection by sampling a wide range of
both user data and application data.
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Figure 3: A generalized representation of the differ-
ences in entropy between compressed and encrypted
packets. Compressed packets are 99.5% as entropic as
encrypted packets, while each group has a large stan-
dard deviation of entropy across packets.
4 IMPLEMENTATION
As noted by Malhotra [10], many compression algorithms
have a fingerprint of some sort. While the clearest indication
of compression is in file headers, there also exists “a small
difference in the [overall] entropy levels of an encrypted
stream and a compressed stream”, and compressed files in-
herit some degree of non-randomness from their correspond-
ing uncompressed files [10]. This suggests that automated
differentiation of compressed and encrypted traffic should be
possible. Without relying on assumptions about individual
algorithms, this difference in entropy is undetectable to ei-
ther a Chi-Square test or a Shannon Entropy Test. Analysis of
our dataset shows that the difference in average entropy be-
tween a large set of generated compressed packet contents
and a corresponding set of encrypted packet contents is
much smaller than the standard deviation of entropy within
each category (Figure 3); we observed an average Shannon
entropy of 1.149 in compressed files and 1.154 in encrypted
files and a standard deviation of 0.451 in compressed files
and 0.453 in encrypted files. This minimal entropy differ-
ence is likely attributable to compression headers (which
are low entropy), further reducing the entropy distinction
across the majority of compressed packets. This means that
thresholding based on entropy is an ineffective classification
method, confirming the claims of D. Wood et al. regarding
the possibility of classifying compressed packets [13].
Our approach instead focuses on machine learning meth-
ods to discover usable nonlinear decision boundaries and
high level features bywhich to preform compression/encryption
classification, avoiding the pitfalls of simple threshholding.
We implemented three such classification techniques: k-nearest
neighbors, a feed-forward neural network, and a 1D convo-
lutional neural network.
4.1 k-Nearest Neighbors
A k-nearest neighbors (k-NN) model was tested as a sim-
ple baseline requiring minimal training effort. Since k-NN
compares a candidate to its neighbors in feature space, high-
level features are not extracted by the model in the manner
Figure 4: A representation of the data format used in
k-NN classification. Chi-Square analysis is performed
on each quadrant of the file, and then concatenated to
generate a dataset with rows containing 4 Chi-Square
columns and one classification column.
they would be in a neural network. Therefore, manual iden-
tification of features is required. The features employed by
our k-NN model are semi-local Chi-Square analyses of each
packet. Individual packets in the training and testing sets are
divided into four equal chunks of data. A Chi-Square distribu-
tion analysis comparing each chunk to a uniform distribution
of possible byte values converts each packet into a length 4
feature vector of χ 2 statistics (Figure 4). Using four features
allows for a model with basic nonlinear decision boundaries,
potentially avoiding the previously discussed difficulty posed
by entropy thresholding. There could theoretically be more
effective features, but the process of discovering them is
challenging and relies on educated guessing. We also tested
features based on localized Shannon entropy, nonlocalized
Shannon entropy, and nonlocalized Chi-Square statistics, but
all were less effective than localized Chi-Square statistics as
feature representations.
We trained a k-NN classifier using the Python SciKit-learn
library [11]. To fine-tune model parameters, we used a vali-
dation set of 3000 compressed and 3000 encrypted packets.
For the purposes of packet classification, the most effective
parameters were k = 9 with a normalized weighting, mean-
ing that each query packet was be compared to its 9 nearest
neighbors, with weighting directly proportional to distance
in feature space.
This methodology is easily employable in real-world net-
work capture analysis, since Chi-Square feature extraction
can be preformed on packets of any length. Reducing the
number of features to a static four-way localized entropy
analysis allows this model to function on any packets with
minimal preprocessing and without padding or other means
of feature dimension normalization, whichwould be required
by models that use raw packet data and require an input of
fixed dimensionality.
4.2 Feed-forward Neural Network
A feed-forward neural network is distinct from k-NN in that
it requires no explicit features aside from the raw packet
payload data. Despite this, feed-forward neural networks
expect an input with a fixed number of degrees. This presents
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issues in the real world, where packet sizes can be wildly
variable. A potential solution would be to pick a number of
bytes such that the large majority of non-cleartext packets
are greater in size than this threshold. Packets exceeding this
size could be truncated, while packets under this length could
be padded or discarded. Fortunately, in the development
and evaluation of such a network, we have the luxury of
standardizing packet sizes to determine the general efficacy
of such an approach. For the purposes of this network, we
re-ran the data generation pipeline with packet sizes fixed
at 1024 bytes. This allowed the raw data of a huge volume
of packets to serve as our neural network training set.
The neural network was built using the Keras library [5]
with a TensorFlow-GPU backend. Keras enables the construc-
tion of feed-forward networks with explicitly defined layers.
We experimented with a number of network architectures,
but settled on a network with 3 ReLU layers with 256, 128,
and 128 neurons, followed by a 1 neuron sigmoid layer. The
kernel initialization was normal for every layer, and the net-
work was trained using Adam optimization [9] on binary
cross-entropy loss with a batch size of 5.
4.3 Convolutional Neural Network
Convolutional neural networks (CNNs) are currently the de
facto standard for difficult classification problems using raw
data. While typically used for image classification, CNNs are
effective across data types and problem domains [12]. The
local connectivity of convolutional neural networks makes
them ideal for identifying regional features [4], making them
an promising choice for classifying packets based on minute
compression fingerprints identified by Malhotra [12] [10].
We implemented a 1DCNNusing Keraswith a TensorFlow-
GPU backend. The CNN, like the linear neural network, took
raw packet payloads as input represented as 1D vectors of
length 1024. The first convolutional layer had 64 filters with
kernel size 16 and ReLU activation followed by a standard
Keras MaxPooling1D layer. The second convolutional layer
had 32 filters with kernel size 16 and ReLU activation fol-
lowed by a MaxPoooling1D layer. The final layer was a fully-
connected sigmoid layer with one neuron, allowing the com-
plete model to output binary classifications.
The model was trained on 80 epochs with a batch size of
50 using the adam optimizer and a binary crossentropy loss
function.
5 EVALUATION
There is no exact threshold for success for any of the de-
scribed methods. Compression/encryption classification has
never been attempted as a machine learning problem, so
there are no existing baselines against which to compare our
results. However, a successful model would be
Classifier Accuracy
k-Nearest Neighbors 60.0
Feed Forward Neural Net 54.1
Convolutional Neural Net 66.9
Figure 5: Accuracy rates of various approaches when
evaluated on test sets containing equal numbers of
positive/negative examples.
(1) Accurate enough to enable recovery of compressed
files from packets without needing to attempt much
brute-force decompression or file carving on misclas-
sified packets
(2) Fast enough to preform reasonably efficient classifi-
cation for device auditing on a customized router or
programmable switch
The following sections discuss the accuracy results of each
tested model (Figure 5).
5.1 k-Nearest Neighbors
k-NN performance was tested using 10-fold cross validation
on the training set. Each fold used 3000 compressed packets
and 3000 encrypted packets for training and 700 and 700 pack-
ets for testing, respectively. The k-NN achieved an average
accuracy of 60.0% across all folds. These results are clearly
statistically significant; a random model would converge on
a 50% overall accuracy over many trials. Additionally, the
model was more eager to falsely classify compressed packets
as encrypted than it was to classify encrypted packets as com-
pressed. The model misclassified 21.5% of encrypted packets
as compressed, while it misclassified 58.5% of compressed
packets as encrypted.
5.2 Feed-forward Neural Network
The feed forward neural net reached an accuracy asymptote
at 54.1% measured by 10-fold cross validation. Modifying
network hyperparameters resulted in minimal performance
improvement. Any increase in the number of first layer neu-
rons resulted in worse performance, likely due to overfitting.
Training for more epochs resulted in rapid over-fitting, with
accuracy plummeting past 100 epochs. Using stochastic gra-
dient descent as opposed to an Adam optimizer resulted in
slightly worse performance, averaging at 53.5% with similar
parameters. It appears that a standard feed-forward network
lacks the functionality to achieve significant results for this
problem, barring the existence of an extremely unconven-
tional network topology.
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5.3 Convolutional Neural Network
The CNN performed significantly better than the other two
methods. Instead of hitting a rapid asymptote, it was pos-
sible to train this classifier to achieve relatively consistent
results. This model averaged a testing accuracy of 66.9%
measured by 10-fold cross validation. The model still over-
fit rather quickly, with a reduction in accuracy occurring
past 85 epochs. Adding additional layers and filters consis-
tently decreased the accuracy of this model, suggesting that
additional data would be needed to improve classification
accuracy.
6 DISCUSSION
Despite the CNN’s higher accuracy than the other two mod-
els, its performance is still insufficient for real world use.
With an overall accuracy rate below 70%, device auditing
using the classifier would require extensive manual exam-
ination of packets flagged as compressed, since we lack a
gold standard by which to detect compressed packets in the
first place.
Nevertheless, we believe that this project is an important
first attempt at a machine learning problem which we hope
will receive continued attention. Our results demonstrate the
detectability of underlying differences in entropy between
compressed and encrypted data; a simple k-NN model was
able to tag packets as compressed or encrypted with about
60% accuracy, indicating that differences in packet variability
between compressed and encrypted data are more practical
for classification purposes than previously assumed.
While these results are insufficient for the automated pri-
vacy evaluation of consumer devices, we believe that signif-
icant improvements could be made. Given the overfitting
issues observed with both feed-forward neural network and
CNN models, we expect that the collection of additional data
would improve classification accuracy. We are planning to
collect a much larger dataset using the described pipeline,
as well as by hand-labeling packet captures of traffic on an
academic network. We also aim to explore solutions to the
problems presented by variable packet sizes in real-world
networking, such as evaluating the feasibility of padding
too-small packets as compared simply discarding them.
Additional improvements may be possible through adjust-
ments in the machine learning implementations employed in
this work. Further optimization of hyperparameters, includ-
ing network architecture, may provide accuracy benefits;
additionally, this work represents a relatively small sample
of the possible machine learning approaches to this problem.
Experimentation with other types of neural networks, such
as long short-term memory networks (LSTMs) and autoen-
coders, may yield greater accuracy. We are continuing to
work on model improvements, and we hope others in the
community will take on this problem as well.
7 CONCLUSION
The availability of a tool to automatically detect unencrypted
packets regardless of encoding would be a major benefit for
researchers and consumer protection advocates, allowing
rapid evaluation of new networked devices for the privacy
risks associated with the transmission of cleartext data. In
this work, we examined the problem of distinguishing en-
crypted and compressed unencrypted network communica-
tions on a packet-by-packet basis. We trained three machine
learning models to perform this task using only packet con-
tents. A k-nearest neighbors model achieved an accuracy of
60% while a 1D convolutional neural network achieved an
accuracy of 66.9%. These results, significantly higher than
the 50% expected accuracy of random guessing, demonstrate
that the task is feasible and represent a baseline for further
data collection andmodel improvements that will be required
to achieve a useable accuracy for real world device audit-
ing. We have made our dataset of compressed and encrypted
packet contents publicly available and hope that others in
the community will use this data to continue research on
this problem.
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